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RECIPE FOR DISASTER: ANALYZING THE
INTERPLAY BETWEEN THE CASTLE DOCTRINE AND




Thirteen years ago, the Supreme Court held that the Fourth Amend-
ment to the United States Constitution requires law enforcement officers
to knock and announce their presence before entering an individual's
home.1 Recently, however, the Court detached the incentive for upholding
this constitutional duty by removing the threat of exclusion as a conse-
quence of violating the knock-and-announce requirement.2 In Hudson v.
Michigan, a five-justice majority instead relied on civil liability and internal
police discipline to deter knock-and-announce violations.3 This Note ar-
gues that these alternative measures lack the disincentive necessary for en-
suring Fourth Amendment compliance.
Further, this Note considers the implication of knock-and-announce
violations in light of the Castle Doctrine. Fifteen states, over the past two
years, enacted laws that presume an intruder is entering a home for pur-
poses of inflicting bodily harm.4 Put differently, homeowners no longer
must prove a fear of imminent danger when justifying the use of deadly
force.5 The Castle Doctrine, in effect, creates a "shoot first, ask questions
later" mindset,6 which directly conflicts with the Court's "enter first, ex-
plain later" interpretation of the Fourth Amendment.
Part II of this Note examines the underlying facts of Hudson v. Michi-
gan. Part III provides a brief history of the knock-and-announce rule and
the exclusionary rule as a remedy for Fourth Amendment violations. Part
IV details the rationale of the majority, concurring and dissenting opinions
* 2007-2008 Editor-in-Chief, Mississippi College Law Review. J.D., Mississippi College School
of Law; B.S., Mississippi State University; A.A. East Central Community College. The author thanks
Professor Judith Johnson for serving as his supervising professor and Professor Deborah Challener for
offering stylistic suggestions upon completion of this Note. In addition, the author thanks his parents
for twenty-five years of love and support.
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3. Id. at 597-98.
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5. See Anthony J. Sebok, Florida's "New Stand Your Ground" Law: Why It's More Extreme
Than Other States' Self-Defense Measures, And How It Got That Way, FINDLAw'S WRrr, May 2, 2005,
http://writ.news.findlaw.com/sebok/20050502.html.
6. Rene Thompson, 'Shoot First' Bill Allows Fear To Determine Value Of Human Life, CIN.
POST, March 22, 2006, at A15.
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in Hudson v. Michigan, and Part V analyzes the case's effect on citizens
and law enforcement officers in Castle Doctrine states.
II. FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
The charges against Booker T. Hudson arose from evidence recovered
during the execution of a search warrant in Detroit, Michigan.7 At 3:35
p.m., on August 27, 1998, seven Detroit policemen arrived at Hudson's
home with a search warrant for narcotics and weapons.8 Officer Jamal
Good, a fourteen-year veteran policeman, 9 was assigned as "shotgun man"
on the raid.' ° The officers failed to knock on Hudson's door but did shout,
"Police, search warrant!""a Three-to-five seconds later, Officer Good
turned the doorknob and entered Hudson's home.12 There, the officers
discovered Hudson seated in a chair, 13 and a subsequent search of his per-
son yielded five rocks of cocaine.' 4 In other parts of the home, officers
seized more cocaine and a loaded revolver.' 5 The officers, based on the
sum of the evidence, charged Hudson with possession of cocaine with in-
tent to deliver and possession of a firearm during the commission of a
felony.'
6
Hudson moved to suppress the evidence seized from his home, arguing
that the officers violated the Fourth Amendment and Michigan law. 7 At
the evidentiary hearing, Officer Good explained that, because occupants
had shot at him on previous police raids, he entered without knocking. 8
The prosecutor then conceded that the officers violated the knock-and-an-
nounce rule, and the trial judge granted Hudson's motion to suppress. 19
The Michigan Court of Appeals, on interlocutory review, reversed.20
The appellate court relied on Michigan Supreme Court case law holding
that suppression is an inappropriate remedy for knock-and-announce viola-
tions.21 Hudson sought leave to appeal the ruling, but the Michigan Su-
preme Court denied the request. Appropriately, the appellate court
remanded the case for trial.23
7. Hudson, 547 U.S. at 588.
8. Brief for Respondent at 1, Hudson v. Michigan, 547 U.S. 586 (2006) (No. 04-1360).
9. Brief for Petitioner at 2, Hudson v. Michigan, 547 U.S. 586 (2006) (No. 04-1360).
10. Brief for Respondent, supra note 8, at 1. "Shotgun man" is a term used to describe the first
officer that enters the home during a police raid.
11. Brief for Petitioner, supra note 9, at 2.
12. Brief for Respondent, supra note 8, at 1.
13. Id.
14. Id.
15. Brief for Petitioner, supra note 9, at 3.





20. Brief for Petitioner, supra note 9, at 4.
21. Id. (citing People v. Vasquez, 602 N.W. 2d 376 (Mich. 1999); People v. Stevens, 597 N.W. 2d





Following a bench trial, Hudson was acquitted of both charges and
instead found guilty of a lesser offense: possession of less than twenty-five
grams of cocaine.24 Although sentenced to eighteen months probation,25
Hudson appealed the conviction to the Michigan Court of Appeals on the
basis that exclusion was the proper remedy for the officer's unlawful en-
try.26 The court affirmed the conviction, however, explaining that "regard-
less of the correctness of [prior Michigan Supreme Court] decisions[,] ...
those cases are binding on this [c]ourt. ' 27 The Michigan Supreme Court
subsequently declined review, thereby reaffirming its prior decisions.28
The United States Supreme Court granted certiorari to decide whether
suppression is an appropriate remedy for knock-and-announce violations.29
On January 9, 2006, the Court held oral argument. 30 Associate Justice San-
dra Day O'Connor participated, but Congress confirmed Justice Samuel
Alito as her replacement before the case was decided.31 On May 18, 2006,
the parties argued the case for a second time-this time in front of Justice
Alito-because the other justices were split four-to-four.32
III. BACKGROUND AND HISTORY OF THE LAW
The Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution provides
that "[t]he right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers,
and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be vio-
lated .... ,,33 The knock-and-announce rule's place within this constitu-
tional framework requires an evaluation of both the Fourth Amendment
right and that right's ancillary remedy.
A. The Knock-and-Announce Rule's Journey Towards
Constitutional Status
Even though evidence suggests that the knock-and-announce require-
ment dates back to 1275, a 1603 English court decision is regarded as "the
judicial source of the common-law standard. ' 34 In Semayne's Case, the
24. Id.
25. Id.
26. Brief for Petitioner, supra note 9, at 5.
27. People v. Hudson, No. 246403 (Mich. App. June 17, 2004).
28. Brief for Petitioner, supra note 9, at 4.
29. Hudson, 547 U.S. at 589.
30. Transcript of Oral Argument, Hudson v. Michigan, 547 U.S. 586 (2006) (No. 04-1360), availa-
ble at 2006 WL 88656.
31. Samuel Alito, Encyclopedia Article, http://encarta.msn.com/encyclopedia_701766459/Sa-
muelAlito. html.
32. Transcript of Oral Argument, supra note 30, available at 2006 WL 1522979. The law profes-
sor that argued Hudson's case in front of the Supreme Court, David Moran, contends that the case's
outcome turned on Justice Alito's appointment. In fact, Moran suggests that "the case almost certainly
would have prevailed" if Justice O'Connor had remained on the bench. 2006 Cato Sup. Ct. Rev. 283,
299.
33. U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
34. Wilson v. Arkansas, 514 U.S. 927, 932 n.2 (1995).
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King's Bench ruled that a sheriff was authorized to break into an occu-
pant's home, but before doing so, "he ought to signify the cause of his
coming" and make a request to open the door.35
American courts, recognizing the importance of notification, eventu-
ally adopted the common law principle mandated in the English courts.36
A Connecticut state court decision was the first United States case to incor-
porate the knock-and-announce requirement. 37 In Read v. Case, a bails-
man assisted the sheriff in breaking down the door. A jury subsequently
found the bailsman liable for trespass damages.38 On appeal, the Connecti-
cut Supreme Court of Errors noted that the bailsman failed to "signify the
cause of his coming, and request admission ....",9
After Read, American courts continued to require law enforcement
officers to provide notification,4" and the majority of states codified the
knock-and-announce principle under statutory law.4 Furthermore, in
1917, Congress passed what is now known as the federal knock-and-an-
nounce statute:
The officer may break open any outer or inner door or win-
dow of a house, or any part of a house, or anything therein,
to execute a search warrant, if, after notice of his authority
and purpose, he is refused admittance or when necessary to
liberate himself or a person aiding him in execution of the
warrant.42
Courts have interpreted both the federal and state codifications as in-
corporating the common law principle, including the rule's exceptions.43
The United States Supreme Court directly evaluated whether the Con-
stitution requires the knock-and-announce rule in Wilson v. Arkansas.44
There, the petitioner appealed a drug conviction and argued that law en-
forcement officers violated the "reasonableness clause" of the Fourth
Amendment by failing to knock and announce. 5 The Court reversed the
35. Id. at 931.
36. Id. at 933.
37. Read v. Case, 4 Conn. 166 (1822).
38. Id.
39. Id.
40. E.g. Wilson, 514 U.S. 927; Sabbath v. United States, 391 U.S. 585 (1968); Wong Sun v. United
States, 371 U.S. 471 (1963); Ker v. California, 374 U.S. 23 (1963); Miller v. United States, 357 U.S. 301
(1958).
41. Robert Driscoll, Unannounced Police Entries and Destruction of Evidence After Wilson v.
Arkansas, 29 COLUM. J.L. & Soc. PROBS. 1, 10 (1995).
42. 18 U.S.C. § 3109 (2006).
43. E.g. Wilson, 514 U.S. at 936 (explaining that police need not knock and announce when there
is a threat of physical violence or where there is reason to believe evidence will be destroyed); Richards
v. Wisconsin, 520 U.S. 385, 394 (1997) (explaining police need knock and announce is not necessary if it
would be futile).
44. 514 U.S. 927 (1995).
45. Id. at 930.
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Arkansas Supreme Court's judgment and held that the knock-and-an-
nounce rule "is an element of the reasonableness inquiry under the Fourth
Amendment." 6 Even so, the Wilson respondent argued that this determi-
nation was not the end of the matter because, even though the knock-and-
announce rule is constitutionally required, the Constitution does not com-
pel suppression as a remedy for a knock-and-announce violation.47 The
Court, however, declined to address this argument, using a footnote to ex-
plain that "this remedial issue was not addressed by the court below and is
not within the narrow question on which we granted certiorari . . "48
B. The Exclusionary Rule As A Constitutional Remedy
The exclusionary rule is the chief remedy for Fourth Amendment vio-
lations.49 In short, the rule protects constitutional guarantees by sup-
pressing evidence seized in an unreasonable search or seizure.5" Although
the remedy is well rooted in constitutional jurisprudence, controversy
plagues its entire existence. Pervasive confusion surrounding the rule's ap-
plication is evident from the Supreme Court's wavering discussions on
when suppression is an appropriate remedial measure for constitutional
violations.
The Supreme Court created the exclusionary rule in the seminal deci-
sion of Weeks v. United States."1 In Weeks, the defendant's conviction
turned on evidence seized in the course of an unlawful search by federal
authorities.52 In an effort to protect "the constitutional rights of the ac-
cused," the Court suppressed the unlawfully seized papers.53 Justice Day,
writing for a unanimous bench, explained that an opposite result would
require the Fourth Amendment to "be stricken from the Constitution" be-
cause it would have "no value."54
The Court, despite its stated concern for protecting individual rights,
initially refused to extend the exclusionary rule to state prosecutions.55 In
Wolf v. Colorado, the Court concluded that Fourth Amendment protection
applies to the states through the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment.56 In any event, the Court explained that the exclusionary
rule "was not derived from the explicit requirements of the Fourth Amend-
ment . . . . " States, as a result, were not required to suppress evidence
obtained in an unreasonable search or seizure, but instead were free to
46. Id. at 934.
47. Id. at n.4.
48. Id.
49. 68 AM. JUJR. 2D Searches and Seizures § 3 (2006).
50. Id.
51. 232 U.S. 383 (1914).
52. Id. at 398.
53. Id.
54. Id. at 393.
55. Wolf v. Colorado, 338 U.S. 25 (1949).
56. Id. at 27-28.
57. Id. at 28.
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fashion other remedies, including private action and internal discipline,
that the Court deemed "equally effective" deterrents. 8
This position, however, was reconsidered twelve years later.59 In
Mapp v. Ohio, the Court acknowledged that other remedies had proved
unsuccessful in deterring law enforcement officers from infringing constitu-
tional rights.6" Overruling Wolf v. Colorado, the Court suppressed unlaw-
ful evidence seized by Ohio police and held that the exclusionary rule is
applicable to the states. 61 In particular, the Court stated that suppression
was "constitutionally necessary" because "[t]o hold otherwise is to grant
the right but in reality to withhold its privilege and enjoyment.
62
Consistent with its unpredictable stance on the exclusionary rule, the
Court subsequently undercut the "constitutionally necessary" language
from Mapp.63 In United States v. Calandra, the Court rejected a constitu-
tional mandate by referring to the exclusionary rule as a "judicially created
remedy designed to safeguard Fourth Amendment rights ... through its
deterrent effect ... ."64 The Court, operating under this idea, refused to
confine the rule's scope to categorical circumstances.65 Rather, the Court
adopted a balancing test that weighs the social costs of applying the rule
with the benefits gained by deterring police misconduct.66
After the Court incorporated the knock-and-announce rule into the
Fourth Amendment reasonableness inquiry in Wilson, the following ques-
tion remained unanswered: Is the exclusionary rule the appropriate remedy
for a knock-and-announce violation? The Sixth and Eighth Circuit Courts
of Appeals and the Arkansas Supreme Court answered the question in the
affirmative, holding that suppression is an appropriate remedy. 67 To the
contrary, the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals and the Michigan Supreme
Court held that suppression is not an appropriate remedy.68 The Supreme
Court used Hudson v. Michigan as a vehicle to resolve the conflict.
IV. THE INSTANT CASE
The Court divided sharply on the issue of whether suppression is the
proper remedy for a knock-and-announce violation. In a 5-4 pronounce-
ment, 69 the Court affirmed Hudson's conviction, holding "that an imper-
missible manner of entry does not necessarily trigger the exclusionary
58. Id. at 31.
59. Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961).
60. Id. at 652.
61. Id. at 655.
62. Id. at 656.
63. United States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338 (1974).
64. Id. at 348.
65. Id. at 349.
66. Id.
67. United States v. Dice, 200 F.3d 978 (6th 2000); United States v. Marts, 986 F.2d 1216 (8th
1993); Mazepink v. State, 987 S.W. 2d 648 (Ark. 1999).
68. United States v. Langford, 314 F.3d 892 (7th 2002); Vasquez, 602 N.W. 2d 376; Stevens, 597
N.W. 2d at 59-62.
69. Hudson, 547 U.S. at 587.
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rule."7 Justice Scalia authored the four-part opinion of the Court, in
which Chief Justice Roberts, Justice Alito, and Justice Thomas joined.7
Justice Kennedy joined Parts I, II, and III and authored a separate opinion
concurring in part and concurring in judgment.72 Justice Breyer authored a
dissenting opinion, in which Justices Ginsburg, Souter, and Stevens
joined.73
A. The Opinion of the Court
The Court set the stage in Hudson v. Michigan by discussing the diffi-
culty police officers face in adhering to the knock-and-announce require-
ment." Specifically, Justice Scalia focused on the vagueness of the Court's
"reasonable wait time" standard that governs the amount of time police
must wait to enter after knocking.75 Justice Scalia explained that police
officers have the complex task of determining "[h]ow many seconds' wait
are too few[.] ' 76 The Court, presumably, took the opportunity to establish
from the outset that any remedy for a knock-and-announce violation must
consider the difficulty of applying the rule.
Next, the Court laid the foundation for a narrow application of the
exclusionary rule. Justice Scalia acknowledged that the Court's decision in
Mapp v. Ohio suggested a wide exclusionary scope but dismissed that ap-
proach as "expansive dicta."' 77 Broad application, Justice Scalia opined,
was rejected in the Court's post-Mapp ruling in United States v. Calandra.78
Under this view, he concluded that the exclusionary rule is best character-
ized as a "last resort" instead of a "first impulse.
79
After planting this seed, the Court focused on three concepts central
to the issue presented. First, the Court examined the level of attenuation
between knock-and-announce violations and evidence yielded from the fol-
lowing search.8" Second, the Court discussed how the social costs of sup-
pressing evidence balance against the benefits of deterring unlawful
entry.81 Third, the Court looked at prior precedent that supported non-
application of the exclusionary rule.82 Each is discussed in turn.
1. Attenuation
Although both parties and amici focused extensively on the issue of
causation in their briefs and at oral arguments, the Court quickly affirmed
70. Id. at 602.
71. Id. at 587.
72. Id.
73. Id.
74. Id. at 590.





80. Id. at 593.
81. Hudson, 547 U.S. at 594.
82. Id. at 599.
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that "but-for" causation is indeed a prerequisite for suppression.83 Without
expanding on its reasoning about the necessity of causation, the Court
turned to its existence in this case.84 Causation was indeed lacking because
the officers obtained a lawful search warrant for Hudson's home.85 Thus,
the evidence leading to Hudson's conviction was not causally related to the
officer's premature entry because "the police would have executed the war-
rant they had obtained, and would have discovered the gun and drugs."86
Even though the Court found "but-for" causation lacking under these
facts, Justice Scalia explained that evidentiary exclusion is inappropriate,
even with a causal link, if the link is "too attenuated to justify exclusion."87
Simply put, attenuation can occur when "the interest protected by the con-
stitutional guarantee that has been violated would not be served by sup-
pression of the evidence obtained.
88
Accordingly, the Court's analysis shifted to the interests protected by
the knock-and-announce rule and the exclusionary rule.89 Three interests
are protected by the knock-and-announce rule: (1) allowing occupants to
comply peaceably with the law by voluntarily permitting officers entry into
the home; (2) avoiding the unnecessary destruction of property caused by
forcible entry; and (3) giving individuals the "opportunity to prepare them-
selves" for the law enforcement officer's entry.90 Contrarily, the exclusion-
ary rule protects the Fourth Amendment by excluding "the fruits of
unlawful warrantless searches."' As a result of these differing interests,
the Court concluded that the causal link between the two rules stretches
too far.92
2. Fourth Amendment Balancing Test
The Court then discussed whether the "deterrence benefits [of apply-
ing the exclusionary rule] outweigh its substantial social costs." 93 Starting
with social costs, the Court explained that the exclusionary rule always
presents the risk of allowing dangerous criminals to roam free in society.94
In fact, Justice Scalia explained that the suppression of evidence for a
knock-and-announce violation provides a "get-out-of-jail-free card" for
criminals.95




87. Hudson, 547 U.S. at 592.
88. Id at 593.




93. Hudson, 547 U.S. at 595-96.
94. Id.
95. Id. at 595.
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Judicial economy also served as a basis for the Court's holding.96 Jus-
tice Scalia feared that future litigants would saturate the court system with
knock-and-announce claims if the remedy were premised on the exclusion
of evidence. 97 Such a litigation flood was troubling, in his view, because
the vagueness of the knock-and-announce rule's "reasonable wait time"
standard makes it difficult for trial judges to determine when a violation
actually occurred.9" Moreover, the fact-intensive nature of the inquiry
makes knock-and-announce violations "even more difficult for an appel-
late court to review. ' 99
Wrapping up the social-cost inquiry, Justice Scalia predicted that po-
lice would "wait longer than the law requires" if a knock-and-announce
violation resulted in the exclusion of evidence.1"' The consequences of
delayed entry are twofold. By waiting longer, police face an increased risk
of physical altercations with the home's occupants. l1 In addition, Justice
Scalia warned that occupants would have a greater opportunity to destroy
evidence if officers waited too long.10 2 The Court, considering both pos-
sibilities, decided that excluding evidence obtained after the violation of
the knock-and-announce rule constituted over-deterrence.
1 0 3
Justice Scalia then set up the deterrence side of the balancing test by
asking whether there is ever a motivation for police officers to violate the
knock-and-announce rule. 10 4 The Court used a comparison between ob-
taining evidence without a warrant and violating the knock-and-announce
rule to conclude that police officers have little incentive to violate the latter
requirement.1 0 5 Justice Scalia further explained that "ignoring the knock-
and-announce rule can realistically be expected to achieve absolutely noth-
ing except the prevention of destruction of evidence and the avoidance of
life-threatening resistance by occupants of the premises .... .106 In con-
trast, violating the warrant requirement could yield "incriminating evi-
dence that could not otherwise be obtained." 107 The Court, therefore,
reasoned that the lack of incentive for violating the knock-and-announce
rule diluted the "deterrence benefits" portion of the balancing test.10 8
In the same vein, Justice Scalia explained that two other devices pro-
vide satisfactory police deterrence: 42 U.S.C. § 1983 actions and internal














109. Id. at 597-98.
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available to deter police misconduct.11 ° He provided no citations to § 1983
cases that produced significant monetary damages, but did insinuate that
settlement opportunities and the availability of attorneys' fees make the
actions enticing for lawyers."11 Also, Justice Scalia noted that the qualified
immunity defense is not prohibiting "colorable" civil actions from going
forward in the lower courts. 1 2 Lastly, the Court ended its balancing test by
explaining that internal police discipline is an effective deterrent.1 3 With-
out offering any empirical data, Justice Scalia attributed his conclusion to
the "increasing professionalism of police forces."' 14
3. Prior Precedent
Justice Scalia used the reasoning from three of the Court's prior deci-
sions to determine that suppression is inappropriate in the knock-and-an-
nounce context." 5 Justice Scalia led with Segura v. United States. In
Segura, the Court did not exclude evidence obtained after police unlawfully
entered a home and waited inside while securing a search warrant."16 Jus-
tice Scalia explained that the Court "distinguished the effects of the illegal
entry from the effects of the illegal search" and that "it would be bizarre to
",117treat more harshly the actions in this case ....
Next, Justice Scalia turned to the Court's opinion in New York v. Har-
ris."' There, the Court did not exclude a defendant's incriminating state-
ment obtained after police unlawfully entered his home and arrested him
without a warrant." 9 Justice Scalia explained that the illegal arrest "was
not the fruit of the fact that the arrest was made in the house rather than
somewhere else.' l2  Likewise, Justice Scalia opined that the unlawful entry
into Hudson's home "was not the fruit of the fact that the entry was not
preceded by knock and announce." '21
Justice Scalia ended his opinion by focusing on United States v. Rami-
rez.'2 2 In Ramirez, police obtained a warrant and broke in the respon-
dent's window.'2 3 Although the Court determined the police's actions
were reasonable under the circumstances, Justice Scalia explained that the
Ramirez opinion recognized that "the causal relationship between the
breaking of the window and the discovery of the guns" would have been
examined if the Court had found the police's actions to be unreasonable. 24
110. Id. at 597.
111. Hudson, 547 U.S. at 597.
112. Id. at 598.
113. Id.
114. Id.
115. Id. at 598-602.
116. Id. at 600.





122. Id. at 602.




Thus, Justice Scalia determined that Ramirez, when read along side Harris
and Segura, lent support to his conclusion that evidence obtained after a
knock-and-announce violation is too attenuated to justify suppression. 25
B. Justice Kennedy's Concurrence
Justice Kennedy wrote separately to convey three key points. 126 First,
Justice Kennedy made it apparent that he did not question the importance
of the knock-and-announce rule. 27 This is clear from his statement that
the case should not be read to suggest that the knock-and-announce rule
"is trivial or beyond the law's concern. "128
Second, Justice Kennedy explained that attenuation is the primary rea-
son for admitting evidence after a knock-and-announce violation.' 29 In his
view, prior precedent dictates that a sufficient causal link is a prerequisite
to applying the exclusionary rule. 3 ° This prerequisite is lacking in the
knock-and-announce context because "the failure to wait at the door can-
not properly be described as having caused the discovery of evidence."''
Justice Kennedy ended his short concurrence by vaguely explaining his
decision not to join Part IV of Justice Scalia's opinion. 3 2 In his view,
Segura and Harris did not "have as much relevance" as Justice Scalia ap-
peared to conclude.133
C. The Dissent
Justice Breyer laid the groundwork for his dissenting opinion with a
simple syllogism. 3 4 First, he noted Wilson's holding that the knock-and-
announce rule is part of the Fourth Amendment reasonableness inquiry.135
Second, he explained that the Court's prior decisions dictate that unreason-
able searches and seizures warrant the suppression of evidence.' 36 Since
the government conceded that the police officers in the instant case vio-
lated the knock-and-announce rule, Justice Breyer used "elementary logic"
to deduce that the subsequent search was unreasonable, and thus,
unconstitutional.1
37
Although he admitted that the exclusionary rule's application involved
a separate inquiry from whether a Fourth Amendment violation occurred,
125. Id.
126. Id. (Kennedy, J., concurring).
127. Id.
128. Id.





134. Id. at 604-08. (Breyer, J., dissenting).
135. Hudson, 547 U.S. at 604-05. (Breyer, J., dissenting).
136. Id. at 608.
137. Id.
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Justice Breyer pointed out that suppression had always been used to rem-
edy such violations unless the admissibility of evidence was being ques-
tioned in a proceeding other than a criminal trial or unless its application
would fail to produce appreciable deterrence. 138 In the case at bar, the
evidence in question plainly pertained to a criminal trial and, as Justice
Breyer later explained, the exclusionary rule is key in deterring knock-and-
announce violations.139 Because neither of the exclusionary rule's categori-
cal exceptions applied in the knock-and-announce context, Justice Breyer
turned his attention to combating the premises relied on by the majority. 4°
In terms of causation, Justice Breyer found a sufficient causal link be-
tween the knock-and-announce violation and the evidence seized in the
subsequent search. 4' He explained that "entry was a necessary condition
of [police] presence in Hudson's home; and their presence in Hudson's
home was a necessary condition of their finding and seizing the evi-
dence." '142 In other words, the officer's actions were unreasonable because
the manner of entry was inseparable from the subsequent search.
143
Consistent with this theme, Justice Breyer rejected the majority's un-
derstanding of the word "attenuation. ' 144 In fact, he argued that prior pre-
cedent offered a different meaning of the term-namely, attenuation
occurs if "the discovery of evidence has come about long after the unlawful
behavior took place or in an independent way .... 145 Applying this defi-
nition, Justice Breyer concluded that attenuation did not break the causal
connection between the knock-and-announce violation and the evidence
seized in the subsequent search.
146
While Justice Scalia applied the Fourth Amendment balancing test by
starting with social costs, Justice Breyer turned first to deterrence. 47 Con-
sidering factors such as time, recoverable damages and money spent on
litigation, Justice Breyer argued that § 1983 suits are an insufficient deter-
rence. 148 Also, he swiftly dismissed the notion that "better trained police"
provide adequate deterrence.
1 49
Turning to social costs, Justice Breyer argued that this case parallels
any Fourth Amendment case.1 50 The social costs of setting the guilty free,
flooding the courts, and making judges make difficult decisions are present
in many cases.15 1 Thus, Justice Breyer explained that the majority argued
138. Id. at 610-11.
139. Id. at 612.
140. Id.
141. Hudson, 547 U.S. at 614 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
142. Id.
143. Id.
144. Id. at 619-20.
145. Id.
146. Id.
147. Hudson, 547 U.S. at 609 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
148. Id. at 609-10.
149. Id. at 610.
150. Id. at 614.
151. Id.
[VOL. 27:435
2008] HUDSON V. MICHIGAN
against the exclusionary rule itself, not its application in the knock-and-
announce context.
152
Finally, Justice Breyer ended his opinion by dismissing the majority's
doctrinal argument.153 In Justice Breyer's view, Segura, Harris, and Rami-
rez offered little support for the majority's holding.1 54 Each case contained
factual circumstances easily distinguishable from Hudson's situation.155
Consequently, Justice Breyer concluded that the majority produced a deci-




The Court's decision in Hudson v. Michigan raises numerous ques-
tions: What impact will the decision have on the exclusionary rule's future
application in other contexts?' 57 Is the exclusionary rule still the appropri-
ate remedy for violations under the federal knock-and-announce stat-
ute? 158  Will individual states determine that their respective state
constitutions mandate the exclusionary rule's application for knock-and-
announce violations?1 59 Each question continues to receive significant
scholarly attention in the wake of the Court's ruling in Hudson v.
Michigan.6 °
In search of novelty, this Note focuses on an implication of the case
receiving far less attention: the interplay between the current status of the
152. Id.
153. Hudson, 547 U.S. at 624-25 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
154. Id.
155. Id. at 624-28.
156. Id. at 630.
157. David Moran suggests that Justice Scalia's opinion in Hudson was a direct attack on the
exclusionary rule. He argues that the exclusionary rule will be overruled in the future if "one more
like-minded justice joins the Court." 2006 Cato Sup. Ct. Rev. 283, 307-09. Professor Craig Bradley
contends that Justice Kennedy's concurrence in Hudson signaled that the Court does not yet have the
necessary votes to overturn the exclusionary rule, but that its fate may not be safe in the future if the
makeup of the Court changes. Mixed Messages on the Exclusionary Rule, TRIAL, Dec. 2006, at 55.
Professor Ashdwon argues that the Court's broad exclusionary rule analysis in Hudson suggests that it
could be overturned in future cases. 67 U. Prrr. L. REV. 753 (2006). Professor Henry Fradella ana-
lyzed other legal scholarship on the Hudson case and acknowledged the uncertainty of the exclusionary
rule's future. 43 No. 1 CRIM. LAW BULLETIN 6 (2006). A student author, writing for the Harvard Law
Review, contends that the Supreme Court may use the rationale set forth in Hudson to eliminate the
exclusionary rule in future cases. The Supreme Court, 2006 Term - Leading Cases, 120 HARV. L. REV.
173, 174 (2006).
158. Professor Orin Kerr and David Moran debated whether the exclusionary rule is still the
appropriate remedy for violations of the federal knock-and-announce statute. Professor Kerr argues
that the exclusionary rule still applies to federal violations because the Court did not overrule Miller v.
United States and Sabbath v. United States in the Hudson decision. Opposing this view, Moran was
willing to bet Professor Kerr $500 that the exclusionary rule no longer remains a viable federal remedy
for federal knock-and-announce violations. Remedies for Knock-and-Announce Violations in Federal
Court After Hudson v. Michigan, http://www.orinkerr.com/2006/07/11/remedies-for-knock-and-an-
nounce-violations-in-federal-court-after-hudson-v-michigan/ (last visited February 21, 2007).
159. See Sheryl Gordon McCloud, Will State or Federal Constitutional Law Save the 'Knock, An-
nounce, & Wait' Rule from a Drug Exception?, http:l/www.nacdl.org/CHAMPION/ARTICLES/
97aprOl.htm.
160. Supra notes 157, 158, 159.
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knock-and-announce rule and the Castle Doctrine. Law enforcement of-
ficers no longer have any incentive to comply with the knock-and-an-
nounce rule after the Court's ruling in Hudson v. Michigan, on the one
hand, and citizens in Castle Doctrine states are literally armed with free
reign to use deadly force against suspected intruders without threat of
criminal or civil liability, on the other hand. This Note argues that the in-
terplay between the two doctrines will exacerbate violence among law en-
forcement officers and homeowners in Castle Doctrine states.
A. Why Knock Anymore?
Justice Breyer's dissenting opinion in Hudson v. Michigan aptly noted
that "the Court destroy[ed] the strongest legal incentive to comply with the
Constitution's knock-and-announce requirement" when it refused to rem-
edy the violation with the exclusionary rule.' 61 While Justice Scalia offered
several deterrent substitutes, each is insufficient to ensure law enforcement
compliance.
Four obstacles impede civil liability from deterring non-compliance.
First, it is unlikely that a criminal defendant would file a lawsuit over a
knock-and-announce violation because there is no right to counsel in civil
suits. 162 Second, the criminal defendant would face difficulty obtaining pri-
vate counsel because such a case is unattractive considering the "expensive
[and] time-consuming" nature of the suit when compared with the nominal
recovery that would probably be awarded.163 Third, recovery is unlikely,
even if the criminal defendant does file a suit, because officers are often
shielded by the doctrine of qualified immunity.1 64 Fourth, research sug-
gests that jurors favor police officers in civil actions, especially where the
plaintiff is an individual convicted of a crime. 165 For these reasons, civil
liability, at best, is a dubious deterrent substitute.
Likewise, internal police procedures are inadequate to deter non-com-
pliance with the knock-and-announce rule. Although Justice Scalia came
to the opposite conclusion after noting the "increasing professionalism" of
police officers,166 he failed to discern the principle reason why this increas-
ing professionalism actually exists. As one commentator noted, "the in-
creasing professionalism of police departments that has resulted in more
effective internal discipline was itself a result of the exclusionary rule.'
167
It follows that if the underpinning is removed, the increasing professional-
ism will also disappear.
168
161. 547 U.S. at 605 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
162. Amy Garzon, Comment, United States v. Langford, 48 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 353, 368 (2004).
163. Hudson, 547 U.S. at 610 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
164. See Wilson v. Layne, 526 U.S. 603 (1999).
165. Garzon, supra note 162.
166. Hudson, 547 U.S. at 598 (Breyer, J., dissenting).




Moreover, any argument that police still have an incentive to comply
with the knock-and-announce rule because policemen fear that homeown-
ers will mistake them for an intruder is unpersuasive. Even if some officers
believe that notification provides protection, it is not the prevailing attitude
of law enforcement officers. Justice Breyer recognized this reality in his
dissenting opinion: "[D]rug enforcement authorities believe that safety for
the police lies in a swift, surprising entry with overwhelming force-not in
announcing their official authority." '169 As further support, the prodigious
number of knock-and-announce violations that occur each year indicate a
police preference for surprise entry.
170
Plainly, the problems surrounding each deterrent substitute confirm
that there is no longer an incentive for law enforcement officers to comply
with the knock-and-announce rule. Indiana Law Professor Craig Bradley's
prophetic statement underscores the point:
I have no doubt that days after this decision was rendered,
memos (or at least phone calls, for those who didn't want to
encourage Fourth Amendment violations in writing) went
out from police department lawyers around the country,
telling police officers, "You no longer have to knock and
announce."171
As this remark suggest, the Supreme Court removed all "bite" from
the knock-and-announce rule by holding that a violation does not compel
evidentiary exclusion.
B. The Deadly Ingredients: Knock-and-Announce Rule Meets
Castle Doctrine
On April 26, 2005, Florida became the first state to enact a Castle
Doctrine law.172 The law's purpose is to provide immunity from civil and
criminal liability to "citizens who use deadly force in self-defense. '173 De-
spite much controversy, fourteen states passed similar statutes in the two
years following Florida's enactment.
174
The Castle Doctrine establishes the presumption that a homeowner's
use of force against an intruder is necessary to protect the homeowner's
safety.'75 Under prior Florida law, homeowners were required to prove a
fear of imminent danger to establish justification for the use of deadly
169. Hudson, 547 U.S. at 609 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
170. See Craig Hemmens & Chris Mathias, United States v. Banks: The "Knock-and-Announce
Rule" Returns to the Supreme Court, 41 IDAHO L. REV. 1, 12 (2004).
171. Mixed Messages on the Exclusionary Rule, TRIAL, Dec. 2006, at 57.
172. Alan Korwin, Florida Castle Doctrine Protects the Innocent, http://www.gunlaws.com/Florida-
Castle Doctrine.htm (last visited Mar. 08, 2007).
173. Sebok, supra note 5.
174. CHRISTOPHER REINHART, OFFICE OF LEGISLATIVE RESEARCH, CONN. GEN. ASSEMB., OLR
RESEARCH REPORT: CASTLE DOCTRINE AND SELF-DEFENSE (2007-R-0052) (Jan. 17, 2007), http://
www.cga.ct.gov/2007/rpt/ 2007-R-0052.htm.
175. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 776.013 (2006); Miss. CODE ANN. § 97-3-15 (2006).
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force.176 But under the revised version of the Florida Code, "[a] person
who unlawfully and by force enters or attempts to enter a person's dwell-
ing ... is presumed to be doing so with the intent to commit an unlawful act
involving force or violence[.] ' ' 177 Thus, the homeowner "has no duty to re-
treat and has the right to stand his or her ground and meet force with force,
including deadly force[.]
' 178
Importantly, critics insist that the Castle Doctrine creates a "trigger-
happy" mentality in citizens' minds. 179 The laws receive extensive media
coverage and the phrase "shoot first, ask questions later" is often used to
describe the Castle Doctrine.18 ° One commentator noted that "[the doc-
trine] sends a very confusing message to the citizens . . . about when they
can use lethal force with impunity."18
Homeowners' perception is important because the Castle Doctrine
does not provide absolute immunity from liability. For example, Florida
revokes the "necessary force" presumption in three situations: (1) when the
homeowner is engaged in unlawful activity inside the home; (2) when the
homeowner uses deadly force against a cohabitant; (3) and when the home-
owner uses deadly force against a law enforcement officer. 182 Each excep-
tion applies even when a homeowner possesses a subjective belief that the
individual entering the home is an intruder.
183
The law enforcement exception is especially troubling because its ap-
plication varies from state to state. In Mississippi, for instance, a home-
owner does not receive the benefit of the "necessary force" presumption if
the homeowner uses force against an intruder that is an on-duty police of-
ficer.184 Indeed, by its very terms, the presumption does not apply when an
intruder "is a law enforcement officer engaged in the performance of his
official duties[.]'' 85 Presumably, this provision applies even if the officer
violates the knock-and-announce rule.
Conversely, Florida law still recognizes the presumption when a home-
owner uses force against an officer who violates the knock-and-announce
rule. In fact, Florida law provides the presumption if the officer does not
"identif[y] himself in accordance with any applicable law." ' 6 Thus, the
plain language of each statute reveals that a homeowner in Florida receives
the benefit of the presumption if a police officer fails to knock-and-an-
nounce, but a Mississippi homeowner does not receive the same treatment
under similar factual circumstances.
176. Sebok, supra note 5.
177. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 776.013.
178. Id.
179. Excerpts from Press Coverage of Florida's "Shoot First" Law, http://www.shootfirstlaw.org/
press/ (last visited Feb. 24, 2007).
180. Id.
181. Sebok, supra note 5.
182. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 776.013.
183. Id.
184. Miss. CODE ANN. § 97-3-15.
185. Id.
186. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 776.013 (emphasis added).
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This inconsistency is problematic considering the overall interplay be-
tween the Castle Doctrine and the knock-and-announce rule. As demon-
strated below, it is easy to imagine a situation where a law enforcement
officer and an unassuming homeowner engage in a violent interaction be-
cause of an officer's failure to knock and announce. Castle Doctrine de-
tractors suggest that such a situation would create a "bad legal tangle for
juries when defendants can claim they thought the officer was an unknown
intruder against whom they had the right to shoot on sight.'
187
Certainly, the current legal climate surrounding the knock-and-an-
nounce rule contributes further to this possibility. Justice Brennan ex-
plained forty-nine years ago that the knock-and-announce rule is a
safeguard for "police who might be mistaken for prowlers and be shot
down by a fearful householder."' 88 The safeguard, however, provides little
protection when police officers have no incentive to follow the knock-and-
announce rule and when citizens reside in Castle Doctrine states. The re-
sult, therefore, is clear: The two doctrines are on a collision course. 18 9
C. Looking At the Past to Predict the Future
Two unfortunate situations illuminate the risks created because of the
interaction between the knock-and-announce rule and the Castle Doctrine.
On October 1, 2000, a police raid in Lebanon, Tennessee turned deadly.' 90
While attempting to execute a drug warrant, five police officers ap-
proached the wrong house. 191 John Adams, a sixty-four year old man, lived
inside the house with his wife Loraine. Loraine heard a noise outside
the house and told her husband to grab his gun because she thought the
officers were criminals who were there to invade their home. 1 93 The police
failed to identify themselves before bursting into the Adams' home, and
Mr. Adams fired shots at the officers upon entry.194 The police officers
returned fire on Mr. Adams.1
95
The consequences of the police officer's failure to announce their pres-
ence proved devastating. Loraine Adams lost her husband.196 The officer
187. Posting of Nathan Newman, http://www.tpmcafe.com/blog/coffeehouse/2006/Jun/15/no-
knockmeetcastledoctrine (June 15, 2006) (last visited Mar. 08, 2007).
188. Miller, 357 U.S. at 313 n.12.
189. Newman, supra note 187.
190. Man Slain In Mistaken Police Raid Drug Informant Gave Officers Wrong Address, CHI.






196. Man Slain In Mistaken Police Raid Drug Informant Gave Officers Wrong Address, CHI.
TRIB., Oct. 8, 2000, at C1O.
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who fired the shots was tried for reckless homicide. 19 7 The Lebanon, Ten-
nessee community lost all faith in their police department.198 Each conse-
quence was the result of what the Lebanon Police Chief called a "costly
mistake."' 99
A Mississippi police raid provides a similar example of tragedy. On
December 26, 2001, police officers obtained a warrant to search a duplex in
Prentiss, Mississippi.200 The warrant permitted the officers to search each
apartment in the duplex; however, the warrant contained only the name of
the individual in the first apartment, Jamie Smith.2 1 After executing the
warrant against Smith, the officers proceeded to the second apartment.
202
There, Cory Maye was sleeping with his one-year old daughter when he
was awakened by the sound of someone trying to kick in his front door.20 3
Maye testified that he retrieved his handgun and shot at the intruders in
order to protect himself and his daughter. 0 4
The results in the raid of Cory Maye's house parallel those in John
Adams' case: one individual was killed and another was charged with mur-
der.20 5 Ron Jones, a policeman involved in the raid, was killed by one of
the shots.20 6 Maye, a twenty-two year old father with no prior criminal
record, was charged and convicted of murder.20 7 Like Adams' case, lives
presumably would have been saved if the officers had identified themselves
prior to the entry in Maye's apartment.
Both situations were viewed as rare, catastrophic occurrences prior to
Castle Doctrine enactments and prior to the Supreme Court's decision in
Hudson v. Michigan. Nonetheless, these examples will become common
events in the near future because of the interplay between the knock-and-
announce rule and the Castle Doctrine. Nothing less than the human life is
at stake.
VI. CONCLUSION
The Supreme Court's decision in Hudson v. Michigan will bolster vio-
lent encounters between police officers and homeowners. Although none
of the Justices referenced the Castle Doctrine in their opinions, the impor-
tance of the doctrine is implicit when considering the practical effects of the
197. Former Police Officer Acquitted Of Killing In Erroneous Drug Raid, MEMPHIS COMMERCIAL
APPEAL, June 10, 2001, at B9.
198. Police Work To Repair Trust After Fatal Drug Raid Mixup, MEMPHIS COMMERCIAL APPEAL,
Dec. 13, 2000, at A2.
199. Lebanon, Tenn., Police Raid Wrong House, Kill Innocent Man, MEMPHIS COMMERCIAL AP-
PEAL, Oct. 6, 2000, at B3.
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case. By removing the incentive to comply with the knock-and-announce
rule, the Court left homeowners vulnerable to surprise encounters with law
enforcement officers. This vulnerability poses significant problems for
both police officers and citizens because of the trigger-happy mindset cre-
ated by the Castle Doctrine.
Thirty-five states currently remain "Castle Doctrine Free." Legislators
in these states should be wary of the Hudson decision because of the pre-
diction set forth in this Note. Instead of falling victim to powerful lobbying
efforts, legislators should opt to protect human life by declining to provide
citizens with a "shoot first, ask questions later" mentality. Citizens in cur-
rent Castle Doctrine states may soon wish their lawmakers had done the
same.

